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Abstract. This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching
games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games
which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game,
the value of a coalition of vertices is the weight of the maximum size matching
in the subgraph induced by the coalition. The Shapley value is one of the most
important solution concepts in cooperative game theory.
After establishing some general insights, we show that the Shapley value of
matching games can be computed in polynomial time for some special cases:
graphs with maximum degree two, and graphs that have a small modular decom-
position into cliques or cocliques (complete k-partite graphs are a notable special
case of this). The latter result extends to various other well-known classes of
graph-based cooperative games.
We continue by showing that computing the Shapley value of unweighted match-
ing games is #P-complete in general. Finally, a fully polynomial-time randomized
approximation scheme (FPRAS) is presented. This FPRAS can be considered the
best positive result conceivable, in view of the #P-completeness result.
1 Introduction
In economics and computer science, one of the most fundamental problems is the allo-
cation of profits or costs based on contributions of the nodes in a network. The problem
has assumed even more importance as networks have become ubiquitous. In this paper,
we address this problem by simultaneously studying two concepts that can be traced to
Lloyd S. Shapley — the Shapley value and matching games.
Lloyd S. Shapley is one of the most influential game theorists in history. Among
his numerous contributions, two of them are the following: (i) formulating the assign-
ment game as a rich and versatile class of cooperative games [19], and (ii) proposing
the Shapley value as a highly desirable solution concept for cooperative games [18].
Both contributions have had far-reaching impact and were part of Shapley’s Nobel Prize
winning achievements. The assignment game is a cooperative game based on bipartite
graphs, and models the interaction between buyers and sellers. It is the transferable util-
ity version of the well-known stable marriage setting and is a fundamental model that is
used for modelling exchange markets and auctions [17]. Assignment games were later
generalized to matching games, for non-bipartite graphs (see e.g., [9, 13]). The main
idea of a matching game is that each node represents an agent and the value of a coali-
tion of nodes is the weight of the maximum weight matching in the subgraph induced
by the coalition of nodes. Whereas the matching game is one of the most natural and
important cooperatives game, the Shapley value has been termed “the most important
normative payoff division scheme” in cooperative game theory [22]. It is based on the
idea that the payoff of an agent should be proportional to his marginal contributions
to the payoff for the set of all players. For an excellent overview of the concept, we
refer the reader to (Chapter 5, [16]). The Shapley value is the only solution concept that
satisfies simultaneously the following properties: efficiency, symmetry, additivity, and
dummy player property.
In this paper we address a gap in the computational cooperative game theory lit-
erature, and we initiate research on the computational aspects of the Shapley value
in matching games. This gap is surprising on two fronts: (i) computational aspects of
Shapley values have been extensively studied for a number of cooperative games (see
e.g., [8, 12, 11]). and (ii) matching games are a well-established class of cooperative
games, and the structure and computational complexity of computing important solu-
tion concepts such as the core, least core, and nucleolus have been examined in-depth
for matching games (see e.g., [1, 20, 13, 7]).
Our results. We study the algorithmic aspects and computational complexity of the
Shapley value for matching games for the first time. We establish first some general
insights and some particular special cases for which the exact Shapley value can be
computed in polynomial time for: graphs with a constant size decomposition into clique
and coclique modules (these include e.g., complete k-partite graphs, for k constant), and
for graphs with maximum degree two. The non-trivial algorithm required for graphs of
maximum degree two illustrates that exact computation of the Shapley value quickly
becomes rather complex, even for very simple graph classes. We then move on to the
central results of this paper, which concerns the general problem: We prove that the
computational complexity of computing the Shapley value of matching games is #P-
complete even if the graph is unweighted. The proof relies on Berge’s Lemma and the
fact that a certain matrix related to the Pascal triangle has a non-zero determinant. We
subsequently present an FPRAS (i.e., a fully polynomial time randomized approximation
scheme) for computing the Shapley value of (weighted) matching games. In view of our
#P-completeness result, the FPRAS is best possible result we can hope for. Due to space
limitations, some proofs in this text have been deferred to the appendix.
Related Work. The complexity of computing the Shapley value of important classes
of cooperative games has been the topic of detailed studies. Deng and Papadimitriou
[8] and Ieong and Shoham [12] presented polynomial-time algorithms to compute the
Shapley value of graph games and marginal contribution nets respectively. On the other
hand, computing the Shapley value is known to be intractable for a number of coopera-
tive games (see e.g., [11, 2]).
Among the classes of cooperative games, matching games are one of the most well-
studied. Deng et al. [9] characterized the core of the matching games and showed that
various problems regarding the core and the least core of matching games can be solved
in polynomial time. For matching games, there has been considerable algorithmic re-
search on the nucleolus: an alternative single valued solution concept(see e.g., [20, 13]).
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The Shapley value of a vertex in a matching game indicates the ability of a vertex to
match with other vertices. It may thus also be viewed as a centrality index of a vertex.
Centrality indices of graphs have received immense interest (see e.g., [5]).
2 Preliminaries
We work throughout this text with undirected weighted graphs G = (N, E,w), where N
is the vertex set, E is the edge set, and w : E → R≥0 is a weight function. For S ⊆ N,
we denote by G(S ) the subgraph of G induced by S , i.e., the graph (S , {e ∈ E : e ∈
S × S }). Some essential basic notions related to graphs and matchings may be found in
the appendix. We assume for the remainder of this text that the reader is familiar with
these.
A cooperative game consists of a set N of n = |N| players and a characteristic
function v : 2N → R associating a value v(S ) to every subset S ⊆ N. A subset of N is
referred to as a coalition in this context. A central question in the theory of cooperative
games is to distribute the value v(N) among the players in a fair and stable manner.
A matching game is a cooperative game (N, v) induced by an undirected weighted
graph G = (N, E,w) (with vertex set N, edge set E, and weight function w : E → R≥0)
such that for any S ⊆ N, v(S ) is the weight of a maximum weight matching of the
subgraph G(S ). For a given graph G, we will denote by MG(G) the matching game
corresponding to graph G.
An unweighted matching game is a matching game for which all weights are 1 in the
associated graph. In unweighted matching games, it holds that v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ) ∈ {0, 1}
for all S ⊂ N, i ∈ N\S . If, for an unweighted matching game (N, v), a player i ∈ N,
and a coalition S ⊆ N\{i}, it holds that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ) + 1, then we say that player
i is pivotal (for coalition S , in game (N, v)). Similarly, if σ : N → N is a permutation
on N, and i is pivotal for set of players p(i, σ) = { j : σ−1( j) < σ−1(i)} (i.e., the players
occurring before i in σ) is pivotal, then we say that σ is pivotal for i.
For the general case of weighted matching games, when S is a coalition not con-
taining player i, we refer to the value v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ) as the marginal contribution of i
to S . When σ is a permutation of N, we refer to the value v(p(i, σ) ∪ {i}) − v(p(i, σ)) as
the marginal contribution of i to σ.
The Shapley value of a player i ∈ N in a cooperative game (N, v) is denoted by
ϕi(N, v), and is defined as follows.
ϕi(N, v) = κi(N, v)/|N|!, κi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(|S |!)(|N|− |S |−1)!(v(S ∪{i})−v(S )). (1)
κi is called the raw Shapley value. It is well-known and straightforward to obtain that
the raw Shapley value can be written as κi(N, v) = ∑σ∈S N (v(p(i, σ) ∪ {i}) − v(p(i, σ), )),
where S N is the set of permutations on the player set N. For an unweighted matching
game, the raw Shapley value of a player is thus equal to the number of pivotal permuta-
tions. We refer to the vectors ϕ = (ϕ1(N, v), . . . ϕn(N, v)) and κ = (κ1(N, v), . . . , κn(N, v))
respectively as the Shapley value and the raw Shapley value of the game (N, v).
The players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric in (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) for
any coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. A player i ∈ N is a dummy if v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ) = 0
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for all S ⊆ N. The Shapley value satisfies the following properties: (i) Effi-
ciency:
∑
i∈N ϕi(N, v) = v(N); (ii) Symmetry: if i, j ∈ N are symmetric, then
ϕi(N, v) = ϕ j(N, v); (iii) Dummy: if i is a dummy, then ϕi(N, v) = 0; (iv) Additivity:
ϕi(N, v1 + v2) = ϕi(N, v1) + ϕi(N, v2) for all i ∈ N;3 and (v) Anonymity: relabeling
the agents does not affect their Shapley value. We are interested in the following
computational problem.
Shapley
Instance: A weighted graph G = (N, E,w) and a specified player i ∈ V
Question: Compute ϕi(MG(G)).
2.1 General insights
In this subsection, we gain some general insights about the Shapley value of matching
games. First, if the graph is not connected, then the problem of computing the Shapley
value of the graph reduces to computing the Shapley value of the respective connected
components.
Lemma 1 (Shapley value in connected components). Let G = (N, E,w) be a
weighted graph with k connected components, and let the respective vertex sets of these
connected components be N1, . . . , Nk. Let v be the characteristic function of the match-
ing game MG(G) on that graph, and let c : N → [k] be the function that maps a vertex
i to the number k such that i ∈ Nk.4 Then, for every vertex i it holds that ϕi(v) = ϕi(vc(i)),
where v j denotes the characteristic function of the matching game on the subgraph
induced by V j.
It is rather straightforward to see that a vertex has a Shapley value zero if and only if it
is not connected to any other vertex.
Observation 1. A player in a matching game has a non-zero Shapley value if and only
if there is an edge in the graph that contains the player. It can thus be decided in linear
time whether a player in a matching game has a Shapley value of zero.
Next, we present another lemma concerning the Shapley value of unweighted
matching games.
Lemma 2. Consider an unweighted matching game (N, v). If for each s ∈ [n − 1], the
number of coalitions of size s for which player i is pivotal in (N, v) can be computed in
time f (n) for some function f : N → R≥0, then the Shapley value of i can be computed
in time n f (n).
3 Exact algorithms for restricted graph classes
Some classes of matching games for which computing the Shapley value is trivial are
symmetric graphs (e.g. cliques and cycles), and graphs with a constant number of ver-
3 The sum of two characteristic functions v1 and v2 on the same player set is defined in the
standard way: as v1(S ) + v2(S ) for all S ⊆ N.
4 For a ∈ N, we write [a] to denote {b ∈ N : 1 ≤ b ≤ a}.
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tices. We proceed to prove this for two additional special cases: graphs that admit con-
stant size (co)clique modular decompositions, and graphs with degree at most two.
3.1 Graphs with a constant number of clique or coclique modules
An important concept in the context of undirected graphs is that of a module. A subset
of vertices S ⊆ N is a module if all members of S have the same set of neighbors in
N \ S . We can extend this notion to weighted graphs by requiring that all members of
S are connected to the same set of neighbors, by edges of the same weight. A modular
decomposition is a partition of the vertex set into modules.
A clique module (resp. coclique module) of a weighted graph is a module of which
the vertices are pairwise connected by edges of the same weight (resp. pairwise discon-
nected). Note that every graph has a trivial modular decomposition into cliques (and
cocliques): the partition of N into singletons.
We prove that if an unweighted graph G has a size k modular decomposition con-
sisting of only cliques or only cocliques, then the Shapley value of MG(G) can be found
in polynomial time. In fact, we will show that this holds for the more general class of
subgraph-based games: We call a cooperative game (N, v) subgraph-based if there ex-
ists a weighted graph G = (N, E,w) such that for S , T ⊂ N, it holds that v(S ) = v(T ) if
G(S ) and G(T ) are isomorphic.
Theorem 1. Consider a subgraph-based cooperative game (N, v). Then, the Shapley
value of (N, v) can be computed in polynomial time if the following conditions hold:
i.) the weighted graph G = (N, E,w) associated to (N, v) is given or can be computed
from (N, v) in polynomial time; 2.) there exists a modular decomposition γ(G) into k
cocliques or k cliques and G is unweighted in the latter case; and iii.) v(S ) can be
computed in polynomial time for all S ⊆ N.
Proof. Note first that one can find for G in polynomial time a minimum cardinality
modular decomposition into cocliques: simply check for each pair of vertices whether
they are disconnected and connected to identical sets of vertices through edges with
identical weights. If so, then they can be put in the same module. Similarly, a minimum
cardinality modular decomposition into cliques can be found in polynomial time in case
the graph is unweighted, by finding a minimum cardinality modular decomposition into
cocliques in the complement of G (i.e., the graph that contains only those edges not in
E).
A set of players S is said to be of the same player type if all players in S are pairwise
symmetric. We first show that all players in the same module of γ(G) are of the same
player type. Let i, j be two players in the same module M in γ(G). Then, for every
coalition C ∈ N\{i, j}, the subgraphs G(C ∪ {i}) and G(C ∪ { j}) are isomorphic (because
G(M) is a clique or coclique), so v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ { j}). Therefore, we know that the
vertices can be divided into a constant number k of player types.
Ueda et al. [21] showed that any cooperative game in which the value of a given
coalition can be computed in polynomial time, and there is known size k partition of
the players into sets of the same player type, then the Shapley value can be computed in
polynomial time via dynamic programming. The number of player types in our game is
5
constant number k of clique and coclique modules, and therefore the result of [21] can
be applied, and proves our claim. ⊓⊔
For matching games, the function v can be evaluated using any polynomial time
maximum weight matching algorithm. Therefore, the above result implies that com-
puting the Shapley value can be done in polynomial time for classes of graphs where
we can find efficiently a size k modular decomposition into cliques or cocliques. This
includes the class of complete k-partite graphs and any strong product5 of an arbitrary
size clique (or coclique) with a graph on k vertices.
Corollary 1. For matching games based on complete k-partite graphs, where k is a
constant, the Shapley value can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 1 also applies to cooperative games such as s-t vertex connectivity games
and min-cost spanning tree games [7, 9], as these are subgraph-based games.
3.2 Graphs of degree at most two
We first examine linear graphs (or: “paths”), i.e., connected graphs in which two ver-
tices have out-degree one and the remaining vertices have out-degree two.
Lemma 3. The Shapley value of a player in a matching game on an unweighted linear
graph can be computed in O(n4) time.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the vertex set is [n] and the edge set is
{{ j, j + 1} : j ∈ [n − 1]}, and that i ∈ [n] is the player of whom we want to compute the
Shapley value. Fix any s ∈ [n − 1], and let ηsi be the number of coalitions of size s for
which vertex i is pivotal. We compute ηsi by subdividing in separate cases and taking
the sum of them:
– The number ηs,lefti = |{S∪{i+1} : S ∈ N\{i, i−1, i+1}, i is pivotal for S }|. Intuitively:
the number of coalitions S where i is pivotal such that adding i to S extends the left
of a line segment.
– The number ηs,righti = |{S ∪ {i − 1} : S ∈ N\{i, i − 1, i + 1}, i is pivotal for S }|.
– The number ηs,connecti = |{S ∪ {i− 1, i+ 1} : S ∈ N\{i, i− 1, i+ 1}, i is pivotal for S }|.
Intuitively: the number of coalitions S where i is pivotal, such that i connects two
line segments.
– η
s,isolated
i = |{S \{i − 1, i + 1} : S ∈ N\{i, i − 1, i + 1}, i is pivotal for S }|.
It is immediate that ηs,isolatedi = 0, since adding i to a coalition S not containing i+ 1
nor i − 1 results in a coalition forming a subgraph in which i is an isolated vertex. For
the remaining three values, ηs,lefti , η
s,right
i , and η
s,connect
i , we show below how to compute
them efficiently.
5 The strong product of two graphs G1 = (N, E1) and G2 = (M, E2) is defined as the graph
(N×M,E′), where E′ = {{(iN , iM), ( jN , jM)} ⊆ N×M : iM = jM ∧{iN , jN } ∈ E1∨{iM , jM} ∈ E2}.
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– For ηs,lefti , observe that adding a vertex to the left of a (non-empty) line segment
L increases the cardinality of a maximum matching if and only if L has an even
number of edges (and thus an odd number of vertices). Therefore, define ηs,lefti (k)
to be the number of coalitions S of size s for which i is pivotal such that S contains
the line segment {i + 1, . . . , i + k + 1}, and does not contain {i − 1, i + k + 2}. The
number ηs,lefti (k) is easy to determine:
η
s,left
i (k) =

0 if k is odd,(
|[n]\{i−1,...,i+k+2}|
s−|{i−1,...,i+k+1}∩[n]|
)
otherwise.
We can then express ηs,lefti as
∑max{n−i−1,s−1}
k=1 η
s,left
i (k). There is only a linear number
of terms in this sum, and all of them can be computed in linear time.
– η
s,right
i is computed in an analogous fashion.
– For ηs,connecti , observe that adding a vertex i to a coalition such that i connects two
line segments L1 and L2, increases the cardinality of a maximum matching if and
only if L1 and L2 do not both have an odd number of edges (or equivalently: not
both have an even number of vertices). Therefore, define ηs,connecti (k1, k2) to be the
number of coalitions S of size s for which i is pivotal such that S contains the line
segments {i − k1 − 1, . . . , i − 1} and {i + 1, . . . , i + k2 + 1}, and does not contain
{i − k1 − 2, i + k2 + 2}. The number ηs,connecti (k1, k2) is easy to determine:
η
s,connect
i (k1, k2) =

0 if k1 and k2 are both odd,(
|[n]\({i−k−2,...,i+k+2}|
s−|{i−k−1,...,i+k+1}∩[n]|
)
otherwise.
We can then express ηs,connecti as
∑max{i−2,s−1}
k1=1
∑max{n−i−1,s−k1−2}
k2=1 η
s,left
i (k1, k2). The
number of terms in this sum is quadratic, and all of these terms can be computed in
linear time. We can thus compute ηs,connecti in O(n3) time.
The claim now follows from Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. For graphs with maximum degree 2, the Shapley value can be computed
in polynomial time.
Proof. A graph with degree at most two is a disjoint union of cycles and linear graphs.
From Lemma 1, we can compute the Shapley value of the connected components sep-
arately. From Lemma 3, we know that the Shapley value of linear graphs can be com-
puted in polynomial time. Due to anonymity, the Shapley value of a cycle is uniform.
⊓⊔
The above proof for linear graphs demonstrates nicely that computation of the Shap-
ley value of a matching game already becomes intricate for even the simplest of graph
structures. We would be interested in seeing an extension of this result that enables us
to exactly compute the Shapley value in any non-trivial class of graphs that contains a
vertex of degree at least three.
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4 Computational complexity of the general problem
In this section, we examine the computational complexity of the general problem of
computing the Shapley value for matching games. As we mentioned in Section 2, Shap-
ley is equivalent to the problem of counting the number of pivotal permutations for
a player in an unweighted matching game, and is therefore a counting problem. It is
moreover easy to see that this counting problem is a member of the complexity class
#P.6
For certain cooperative games such as weighted voting games [11], intractability of
computing the Shapley value can be established by proving that even checking whether
a player gets non-zero Shapley value is NP-complete. Proposition 1 tells us that this
is not the case for matching games. Before we proceed, we establish some notation.
Let G = (N, E) be a graph. Let αk(G) be the number of vertex sets S ⊆ N such that
|S | = k and the subgraph G(S ) of G induced by S admits a perfect matching. Then
αk(G) =
(
n
k
)
− αk(G) is the number of subsets S ⊆ N of size k such that G(S ) does not
admit a perfect matching. In order to characterize the complexity of Shapley, we first
define the following problem.
#MatchableSubgraphsk
Instance: Undirected and unweighted graph G = (N, E) and an even integer k.
Question: Compute αk(G).
Lemma 4. #MatchableSubgraphsk is #P-complete.
Proof. Colbourn et al. [6] proved that the following problem is #P-complete: Given
an undirected and unweighted bipartite graph G = (S ∪ I, E), compute the number
of subsets of B ⊆ S , such that G(B ∪ I) admits a perfect matching.7 The problem is
equivalent to #MatchableSubgraphs2|I|. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. Computing the Shapley value of a matching game on an unweighted graph
is #P-complete.
Proof. We present a polynomial-time Turing reduction from #MatchableSubgraphsk to
Shapley.
Let G0 be the graph in which a new vertex y0 is added to G = (N, E) that is connected
to all vertices in N. For i > 0, let Gi be G0 with i additional vertices y1, y2, . . . , yi and i
additional edges {{y j, y j−1} : j ∈ [i]}.
The first part of the proof consists of showing that the following set of equations
hold:
κyi (MG(Gi)) =
{ C(i) +∑nk=0(k + i)!(n − k)!αk(G) if i is even, (2)
C(i) +∑nk=0(k + i)!(n − k)!αk(G) if i is odd, (3)
6 Informally: #P is the class of computational problems that correspond to counting the number
of accepting paths on a non-deterministic Turing machine. We refer the reader to any intro-
ductory text on complexity theory.
7 The proof of Colbourn resolved “an exceptionally difficult problem” [6]. Interestingly, the
corresponding decision problem of checking whether there exists a subgraph of size k that
does not admit a perfect matching, appears to be open.
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where
C(i) =
⌊i/2⌋∑
k=1
n+i−2k∑
j=0
( j + 2k − 1)!(n + i − j − 2k + 1)!
(
n + i − 2k
j
)
.
Define a type 1 pivotal coalition for yi in MG(Gi) as a pivotal coalition for i in
MG(Gi) that does not contain all players y0, . . . , yi−1. Define a type 2 pivotal coalition
for yi in MG(Gi) as a pivotal coalition for yi in MG(Gi) that does contain all players
y0, . . . , yi−1. Denote by Htype 1i (s) (resp. Htype 2i (s)) the set of type 1 (resp. type 2) pivotal
coalitions for i in MG(Gi) that are of size s. From (1), it follows that
κi(MG(Gi)) =
n+i∑
s=1
s!(n + i − s)!|Htype 1i (s)| +
n+i∑
s=1
s!(n + i − s)!|Htype 2i (s)|. (4)
First we characterize the coalitions in Htype 2i (s).
Lemma 5. If i is even, a coalition S of MG(Gi) is in Htype 2i (s) if and only if G(S ∩ N)
is not perfectly matchable (and {y0, . . . , yi−1} ⊆ S , |S | = s). If i is odd, a coalition
S of MG(Gi) is in Htype 2i (s) if and only if G(S ∩ N) is perfectly matchable (and
{y0, . . . , yi−1} ⊆ S , |S | = s).
The proof of Lemma 5 is deferred to the appendix. From the above lemma, it follows
that the coalitions in Htype 2i (s) are precisely the coalitions of the form T ∪{y0, . . . , yi−1},
where T ⊂ N is such that for even i, G(T ) is not perfectly matchable, and for odd i,
G(T ) is perfectly matchable. Therefore |Htype 2i (s)| = αs−i(G) for even i and |Htype 2i (s)| =
αs−i(G) for odd i, and this implies:
n+i∑
s=1
s!(n + i − s)!|Htype 2i (s)| =

∑n
k=0(k + i)!(n − k)!αk(G) if i is even,∑n
k=0(k + i)!(n − k)!αk(G) if i is odd.
In words: the second summation of (4) equals the summation of (2) when i is even,
and the summation of (3) when i is odd. Therefore, it suffices to prove that the first
summation of (4) equals C(i).
For this sake, define Htype 1i (s, k) for k ∈ [⌊i/2⌋] as {S ∈ Htype 1i (s) : yi−2k < S ∧
{yi−1, . . . , yi−2k+1} ⊆ S }. Observe that {Htype 1i (s, 1), . . . , Htype 1i (s, k/2)} is a partition of
Htype 1i (s). For a given k and s, note that the set Htype 1i (s, k) consists of all coalitions of
the form T ∪{yi−1, . . . , yi−2k+1}, where T ⊆ N ∪{y0, . . . , yi−2k−1}, |T | = s−2k+1. Hence,
|Htype 1i (s, k)| =
(
n+i−2k
s−2k+1
)
(defining
(
a
b
)
= 0 whenever b < 0 or b > a). Therefore:
n+i∑
s=1
s!(n + i − s)!|Htype 1i (s)| =
⌊i/2⌋∑
k=1
n+i−1∑
s=2k−1
s!(n + i − s)!
(
n + i − 2k
s − 2k + 1
)
=
⌊i/2⌋∑
k=1
n+i−2k∑
j=0
( j + 2k − 1)!(n + i − j − 2k + 1)!
(
n + i − 2k
j
)
.
This shows that (2) and (3) hold.
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The second part of the proof consists of showing that all αk(G), k ∈ [n] can be com-
puted from κyi (MG(Gi)) in polynomial time, using (2) and (3), for i ∈ [n] ∪ {0}. This
is sufficient to complete the proof, because the graphs G0, . . . ,Gn can clearly be con-
structed from G in polynomial time, hence a polynomial time algorithm that computes
αk from κyi (MG(Gi)), i ∈ [n] is a polynomial Turing reduction.
Let βi(G) = αi(G) for even i and let βi(G) = αi(G) for odd i. We can represent (2)
and (3) for i ∈ [n] ∪ {0} as the following system of equations:

0!n! 1!(n − 1)! · · · n!0!
1!n! · · · (n + 1)!0!
..
.
..
.
. . .
..
.
n!n! · · · (2n)!0!

×

β0(G)
β1(G)
..
.
βn(G)

=

κy0 (MG(G0)) −C(0)
κy1 (MG(G1)) −C(1)
..
.
κyn (MG(Gn)) −C(n)

(5)
Denote by A the (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix in the above equation. Recall that a scalar
multiplication of a column by a constant c multiplies the determinant by c. Therefore, A
is nonsingular if and only if nonsingularity also holds for the (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix B,
defined by Bi j = (i+ j)!. B is a matrix that is related to Pascal’s triangle, and it is known
that its determinant is equal to ∏ni=0 i!2 , 0 [3, 2]. It follows that A is nonsingular, so our
system of equations (5) is linearly independent and has a unique solution. Note that all
entries in the system can be computed in polynomial time (assuming that the Shapley
value of a matching game is polynomial time computable): The constants C(i) consist
of polynomially many terms, and all factorials and binomial coefficients that occur in
(5) are taken over numbers of magnitude polynomial in n.
Therefore, we can use Gaussian elimination to solve (5) in O(n3) time. It follows
that for all i ∈ [n], βi(G) can be computed in polynomial time, and hence αi(G) can
be computed in polynomial time. Therefore, if there exists an algorithm that solves
Shapley in polynomial time, then it can also be used to solve #MatchableSubgraphsk
in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
5 An approximation algorithm
In this section, we show that although computing exactly the Shapley value of matching
games is a hard problem, approximating it is much easier.
Let Σ be a finite alphabet in which we agree to describe our problem instances and
solutions. A fully polynomial time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) for a
function f : Σ∗ → Q is an algorithm that takes input x ∈ Σ∗ and a parameter ǫ ∈ Q>0,
and returns with probability at least 34 a number in between f (x)/(1+ ǫ) and (1+ ǫ) f (x).
Moreover, an FPRAS is required to run in time polynomial in the size of x and 1/ǫ. The
probability of 34 is chosen arbitrarily: by a standard amplification technique, it can be
replaced by an arbitrary number δ ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting algorithm would then run in
time polynomial in n, 1/ǫ, and log(1/δ).
We will now formulate an algorithm that approximates the raw Shapley value of a
player in a weighted matching game, and show that it is an FPRAS. Note that we cannot
utilize approximation results in [14] and [4] since matching games are neither convex
nor simple. Our FPRAS is based on Monte Carlo sampling, and works as follows: Let
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(G = (N, E,w), i, ǫ) be the input, where G is the weighted graph representing match-
ing game MG(G), i ∈ N is a player in MG(G), and ǫ is the precision parameter. For
notational convenience, we write κi as a shorthand for κi(MG(G)). The algorithm first
determines whether κi = 0 (Observation 1). If so, then it outputs 0 and terminates. If
not, then it samples ⌈4n2(n − 1)2/ǫ2⌉ permutations of the player set uniformly at ran-
dom. Denote this multiset of sampled permutations by P. The algorithm then outputs
the average marginal contribution of player i over the permutations in P and terminates.
Note that this average marginal contribution is efficiently computable: it is given by
1/⌈4n2(n−1)2/ǫ2⌉ times the sum of the marginal contributions of player i to each of the
sampled permutations. Determining these marginal contributions can be done in poly-
nomial time, using any maximum weight matching algorithm. Denote our sampling
algorithm by MatchingGame-Sampler.
MatchingGame-Sampler resembles the algorithms in [15, 14]: the differences are
that the algorithm takes a different number of samples, and that it determines whether
the Shapley value of player i is 0 prior to running the sampling procedure. Moreover,
its proof of correctness requires different insights.8
Theorem 4. MatchingGame-Sampler is an FPRAS for the raw Shapley value in a
weighted matching game.
Proof. Denote by κ¯i the output of the algorithm. If κi = 0, then MatchingGame-Sampler
is guaranteed to output the right solution, so assume that κi > 0. Let wmaxi be the maxi-
mum weight among the edges attached to i, and let emaxi ∈ E be an edge that is attached
to i such that w(emaxi ) = wmaxi . Let X be a random variable that takes the value of n! times
the marginal contribution of player i in a uniformly randomly sampled permutation of
the players. Note that E[X] = κi. Note that the marginal contribution of a player in any
permutation is at most wmaxi , so X is at most w
max
i n!.
Let j be the neighbor of i connected by emaxi . Observe that any permutation in which
j is positioned first, and i is positioned second, is a permutation for i in which the
marginal contribution of i is wmaxi . There are (n − 2)! such permutations, so the raw
Shapley value κi of i is at least wmaxi (n − 2)!. For the variance of X we obtain
Var[X] = E[X2] − E[X]2 ≤ E[X2] ≤ (wmaxi )2n!2 ≤ n2(n − 1)2κ2i .
Observe that κ¯i is a random variable that is equal to
∑⌈4n2(n−1)2/ǫ2 ⌉
j=1 X j
⌈4n2(n−1)2/ǫ2⌉ , where X j are inde-
pendent random variables with the same distribution as X. From this we obtain that
E[κ¯i] = E[X] = κi. The desired approximation guarantee then follows from Cheby-
8 To be precise, this applies only to [14]. For the sampling algorithm in [15], no proof or
approximation-quality analysis of any kind is given.
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shev’s inequality,9 and completes the proof:
Pr[|κ¯i − κi| ≥ ǫκi] ≤
Var[κ¯i]
ǫ2κ2i
=
Var
[
1
⌈4n2(n−1)2/ǫ2⌉
∑⌈4n2(n−1)2/ǫ2⌉
j=1 X j
]
ǫ2κ2i
=
( Var[X]
⌈4n2(n−1)2/ǫ2⌉
)
ǫ2κ2i
≤
n2(n − 1)2κ2i
(4n2(n − 1)2/ǫ2) · ǫ2κ2i
≤
1
4
.
⊓⊔
Corollary 2. The algorithm that runs MatchingGame-Sampler and returns its output
scaled down by 1/n!, is an FPRAS for the Shapley value of a weighted matching game.
Observe that MatchingGame-Sampler is an FPRAS in the strong sense that its run-
ning time does not depend on the weights of the edges. Due to the #P-completeness
result stated in Theorem 4, this FPRAS is the best one can hope for, and provides us
with a complete answer to the precise complexity of this problem (based on our best
judgment).
Acknowledgements. The authors thank Ross Kang for various helpful discussions.
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Appendix
Graphs and Matchings Basics. Given an undirected graph G = (N, E) (with vertex set
N and edge set E), a matching of G is a subset M of E such that e ∩ e′ = ∅ when
e, e′ ∈ M, e , e′. When discussing a particular matching M, we refer to the edges of
a matching M as matched edges, and those outside M as unmatched edges. A matched
graph is a pair (G, M) where G is a graph and M is a matching of G. A maximum
matching of G is a matching of maximum cardinality among the set of all matchings of
G.
We call a vertex i exposed or unmatched in (G, M) when i is not in any edge of M.
Otherwise, we call i matched. An alternating path P in (G, M) is a path in G where
the edges of P alternate between edges in M and edges in E\M. An augmenting path
P (with respect to a matching M) is an alternating path in G of which the endpoints
are both exposed vertices. An augmenting path thus has odd length, starts with an un-
matched edge, and ends with an unmatched edge. The following lemma is fundamental
to matching theory:
Lemma 6 (Berge’s lemma). Let G = (V, E) be a graph. A matching M of G maximum
if and only if there is no augmenting path in G with respect to M.
Suppose we have a matching M for a graph G that is not a maximum matching.
Then by the above lemma, there is an augmenting path P. It can be seen that removing
from M the matched edges of P and adding to M the unmatched edges of P, gives us
a bigger matching (i.e., a matching with one additional edge). We refer to this as the
operation of augmenting M along P. Likewise, it is possible to augment a matching
along an even-length alternating path with one exposed vertex and one matched vertex
as endpoints. Augmenting along such a path does not increase the cardinality of the
matching.
Observe that if P is an alternating path that is not augmenting, then it still possible
to augment the matching along P iff one of the endpoints of P is an exposed vertex. Ed-
monds’ blossom algorithm [10] is a polynomial time algorithm for finding a maximum
weight matching in a graph.
Let M1 and M2 be two distinct maximum matchings for an unweighted graph
G = (V, E). Then M2 can be obtained from M1 by a sequence of augmentations along
mutually disjoint even-length alternating paths and even-length alternating cycles. A
rough sketch of a proof for this is as follows: We investigate the symmetric difference
D of M1 and M2, and conclude that D must be a collection of disjoint even-length paths
and even length cycles of which the edges alternate between edges in M1 and edges
in M2. A cycle in D must be an alternating cycle in M1, and a path in D must be an
alternating path in M1. After augmenting M1 along such a cycle or path, we obtain a
matching M3 such that the symmetric difference between M3 and M2 is D minus the
cycle or path that we augmented. So by augmenting along all paths and cycles in D, we
obtain M2.
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Proof of Lemma 1. We prove this for k = 2. For k > 2, the claim then holds by
straightforward induction.
Therefore, let N1 and N2 be the vertex sets of the two connected components of G,
and let (N, v′N1 ) and (N, v′N2 ) denote the matching game obtained by removing from the
graph all edges among vertices in respectively N1 and N2. Note that (V, v) is the sum of
v′N1 and v
′
N2 .
By the additivity property of the Shapley value, it therefore holds for every player i
that ϕi(v) = ϕi(v′N1 )+ ϕi(v′N2 ). It suffices to show that ϕi(v′N1 ) = ϕi(vN2 ) for all i ∈ N1 and
that ϕi(v′N2 ) = ϕi(vN2 ) for all i ∈ N2. We do this by showing that ϕi(V) = ϕi(V ∪ { j}),
where j is an arbitrary player from U. The claim for k = 2 then follows by induction
and symmetry.
The fact that ϕi(V) = ϕi(V ∪ { j}) holds, follows from the following derivation:
ϕi(V)
=
1
|V |!
∑
S :S⊆V\{i}
|S |!(|V | − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
(|V | + 1)!
∑
S :S⊆V\{i}
(|S | + 1 + |V | − |S |)|S |!(|V | − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
|V ∪ { j}|!
∑
S :S⊆V\{i}
(|S | + 1)!(|V | − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
+
1
|V ∪ { j}|!
∑
S :S⊆V\{i}
|S |!(|V | − |S |)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
|V ∪ { j}|!
∑
S :S⊆(V∪{ j})\{i}, j∈S
|S |!(|V ∪ { j}| − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
+
1
|V ∪ { j}|!
∑
S :S⊆(V∪{ j})\{i}, j<S
|S |!(|V ∪ { j}| − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
|V ∪ { j}|!
∑
S :S⊆(V∪{ j})\{i}
|S |!(|V ∪ { j}| − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
= ϕi(V ∪ { j}).
⊓⊔
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Proof of Lemma 2. Let ηsi be the number of coalitions of size s for which a vertex i is
pivotal.
ϕi(v) = 1
|V |!
∑
S :S⊆V\{i}
|S |!(|V | − |S | − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
|V |!
|V |−1∑
s=1
∑
S :S⊆V\{i}
|S |=s
s!(|V | − s − 1)!(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
|V |!
|V |−1∑
s=1
s!(|V | − s − 1)!
∑
S :S⊆V\{i})
|S |=s
(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ))
=
1
|V |!
|V |−1∑
s=1
s!(|V | − s − 1)!ηsi .
Therefore, the problem of computing the Shapley value reduces to computing ηsi for
all s ∈ [0, . . . , |V − 1|]. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Lemma 5 for even i. (⇒) Let M be a maximum matching for Gi(S ). S is pivotal,
so M is not a perfect matching. We can assume though, that all vertices {y0, . . . , yi−1}
are matched to each other in the matched graph (Gi(S ), M), because Gi({y0, . . . , yi−1})
is a linear graph with an even number of vertices, and is thus perfectly matchable. It
follows that the exposed nodes of (Gi(S ), M) are all in N, and therefore the matching
M restricted to N is a maximum matching for G(S \{y0, . . . , yi−1}) = G(S ∩ N) that is
non-perfect.
(⇐) Let M be a maximum (non-perfect) matching for G(S ∩ N) and let y be an
exposed vertex of (G(S ∩ N), M). Then M′ = M ∪ {{y j, y j+1} : j even ∧ j < i} is a
maximum matching for Gi(S ), by Berge’s lemma (Lemma 6), as it is clear that there
is no augmenting path in (Gi(S ), M′). Moreover, observe that in (Gi(S ), M′) there is an
even-length alternating path from y to yi−1. Therefore, there is in (Gi, M′) an augmenting
path from y to yi, and it follows again by Berge’s lemma that S is pivotal.
Proof of Lemma 5 for odd i. (⇒) Let M′ be a maximum matching for Gi(S ). S is pivotal,
so in (Gi(S ), M′) there is an even-length alternating path P from an exposed node y
to yi−1. Obtain the matching M by augmenting M′ along P. M is then a maximum
matching for Gi(S ) in which yi−1 is exposed. Gi({y0, . . . , yi−1}) is a linear graph and
M is maximum, so it follows that yi−1 is the only exposed node in (Gi(S ), M) among
{y0, . . . yi−1}. Therefore S∩N must be matched to each other in (G(S ), M) (for otherwise,
in (Gi(S ), M) there would be an augmenting path from yi−1 to an exposed node of S ∩N,
contradicting the fact that M is a maximum matching for Gi(S )). It follows that G(S∩N)
is perfectly matchable.
(⇐) Let M be a maximum perfect matching for G(S ∩ N). Let M′ be a maximum
matching for Gi({y0, . . . , yi−1}) in which yi−1 is the only exposed node. Then M ∪ M′
is a matching for Gi(S ) in which yi−1 is the only exposed node. M ∪ M′ is clearly a
maximum matching, and in (Gi, M ∪ M′) the edge {yi−1, yi} is exposed. So S is pivotal.
⊓⊔
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